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WITH GREATER POWER COMES GREATER
RESPONSIBILITY? TAKEOVER PROTECTION AND
CORPORATE ATTENTION TO STAKEHOLDERS
ALEKSANDRA KACPERCZYK*
Stephen M. Ross School of Business, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan,
U.S.A.
Using takeover protection as an indicator of corporate governance, this study examines how
an exogenous shift in power from shareholders to managers affects corporate attention to non-
shareholding stakeholders. Two competing hypotheses are entertained. The shareholder view
predicts that stronger takeover protection will lead to a decrease in corporate attention to
shareholders and non-shareholding stakeholders alike, as managers divert resources from share-
holders to the pursuit of their private interests. The stakeholder view, in contrast, predicts that
stronger takeover protection will increase corporate attention to non-shareholding stakehold-
ers. Because catering to non-shareholding stakeholders contributes to the long-term value of
the firm, managers will be more likely to attend to those stakeholders when relieved from short-
termism triggered by the threat of hostile takeovers. Using a sample of 878 U.S. firms from
1991 to 2002, the study finds that an exogenous increase in takeover protection leads to higher
corporate attention to community and the natural environment, but has no impact on corpo-
rate attention to employees, minorities, and customers. Additional analyses show that firms that
increase their attention to stakeholders experience an increase in long-term shareholder value.
These findings provide additional evidence that relief from short-termism is a likely source of
the increase in corporate attention to non-shareholding stakeholders following the increase in
takeover protection. Copyright  2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
INTRODUCTION
In corporate America, where ownership is sepa-
rated from control, managers have broad discretion
over corporate resources (Berle and Means, 1932).
Vested with extensive decision-making power,
CEOs are constantly subjected to societal calls
for expanding their attention beyond equity hold-
ers to include ‘. . . employees, customers, (and) the
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general public’ (Kaysen, 1957: 313). For example,
computer, chemical, and auto manufacturers have
recently been pressured to develop and implement
environmentally friendly practices and products.
Although CEOs are increasingly responding to the
calls for a greater attention to non-shareholding
stakeholders (Cortese, 2002), their discretion over
how to allocate corporate resources is constrained
by governance mechanisms intended to disci-
pline top managers in their pursuit of shareholder
value. How does shareholder control over the
incumbent management affect the way that the
resources of the firm are allocated? Will man-
agers be more inclined to attend to the interests
of non-shareholding stakeholders when freed from
the constraints of shareholder control?
Copyright  2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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The present study examines how corporate gov-
ernance, defined as a set of mechanisms through
which shareholders can limit managerial discretion
to pursue ends other than shareholder value (Fama,
1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Shleifer and Vishny,
1997), shapes corporate attention to stakeholders.
Attending to stakeholders represents the efforts
of the firm to proactively support the interests
of primary non-shareholding stakeholders, such as
employees, customers, communities, or the natural
environment (Clarkson, 1995; Wood, 1991). How
the strength of corporate governance influences
firms’ attention to stakeholders can be framed
within the broader debate about the purpose of
the corporation (e.g., Freeman, Wicks, and Parmar,
2004; Sundaram and Inkpen, 2004).
Two dominant perspectives shed light on the
purpose of the firm. The shareholder view posits
that firms create value for society by maximiz-
ing shareholder wealth (Fama and Jensen, 1983;
Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Corporations either
bear no direct responsibility toward non-share-
holding stakeholders, given that freely elected gov-
ernments are the only legitimate actors to redress
social problems (Friedman, 1970), or fulfill their
duty implicitly, by maximizing shareholder value
to benefit all other stakeholders (Jensen, 2002).
The stakeholder model, in contrast, contends that
no one stakeholder, defined as ‘any group or
individual who can affect or is affected by the
achievement of an organization’s purpose’ (Free-
man, 1984: 53), has a prima facie priority over
other groups, and that corporations must balance
the interests of all stakeholders (Donaldson and
Preston, 1995; Freeman, 1984; Freeman, Harri-
son, and Wicks, 2007a; Hill and Jones, 1992;
Jones, 1995; Post, Preston, and Sachs, 2002).
While each perspective has inspired a separate
stream of research on the purpose of the firm,
this study suggests that a joint consideration of the
insights derived from each view can enhance the
understanding of how governance affects corporate
attention to non-shareholding stakeholders.
Although informative, previous studies have
been largely limited in their conclusions about
the influence of governance on corporate attention
to stakeholders. First, they have taken into con-
sideration a number of governance mechanisms,
such as insider ownership (Atkinson and Galask-
iewicz, 1988; Coffey and Wang, 1998; Galask-
iewicz, 1997; Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Johnson
and Greening, 1999; Kosnik, 1990; Zahra, Oviatt,
and Minyard, 1993), institutional ownership (Cof-
fey and Wang, 1998; Galaskiewicz, 1997; Johnson
and Greening, 1999), and outside director repre-
sentation on the board (Johnson and Greening,
1999; Wang and Coffey, 1992). Those mecha-
nisms, however, are inadequate proxies for the bal-
ance between managerial decision-making power
and shareholder control. For example, CEO own-
ership amounts to less than 5 percent in more than
90 percent of U.S. corporations (Ofek and Yer-
mack, 2000), outside ownership is often dispersed
(Berle and Means, 1932), and corporate boards,
even ones dominated by outsiders, are frequently
ineffective in disciplining the incumbent CEOs
(Westphal, 1999). Given that the discrete gover-
nance mechanisms considered in prior studies do
not fully reflect the extent of shareholder influence
on managerial control over corporate resources,
the theoretical implications of the existing findings
remain unclear.
Previous studies have further documented
mostly empirical associations between governance
and corporate attention to non-shareholding stake-
holders (e.g., Coffey and Wang, 1998; Johnson and
Greening, 1999), and have fallen short of establish-
ing causality. Though useful in shedding new light
on the relation between governance and corporate
attention to stakeholders, associations documented
in prior research are subject to the problem of
reverse causality. For example, a positive relation
between corporate attention to stakeholders and
insider ownership (e.g., Zahra et al., 1993) may
either indicate that managers with higher equity
holdings are more inclined to attend to the interests
of stakeholders, or that insiders are more likely to
acquire higher stakes in stakeholder-friendly firms.
Providing insight into cause and effect, though
notoriously difficult, is necessary to understand
how governance structures shape corporate atten-
tion to stakeholders.
The present study seeks to address the limita-
tions of prior research and to provide an addi-
tional step toward understanding the effect of
governance on corporate attention to stakehold-
ers by examining how takeover protection affects
the way organizations cater to the demands of
non-shareholding stakeholders. Takeover protec-
tion indicates an array of devices, ranging from
firm-specific antitakeover provisions in corporate
charters to state antitakeover legislation, which aim
to protect the firm from being taken over by a hos-
tile acquirer. These devices reduce the influence
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of the takeover market, considered the major dis-
ciplinary mechanism to enforce managerial atten-
tion to the stock price (Fama, 1980; Jensen and
Ruback, 1983). By reducing the threat of hostile
takeovers and shielding managers from the invol-
untary turnover that typically follows a change in
control (Easterbrook and Fischel, 1981; Walsh and
Seward, 1990), takeover protection increases man-
agerial decision-making power and control over
firms’ resources.
Examining the relation between takeover protec-
tion and corporate attention to stakeholders pro-
vides an excellent context in which to evaluate
the purpose of the firm through the lenses of
the shareholder and stakeholder models. Hostile
takeovers have led to a confrontation of the two
coexisting ways to conceptualize the purpose of
the public corporation, exposing the fundamental
tension inherent in our understanding of the theory
of the firm (Allen, 1992). In the context of hos-
tile takeovers, the two views generate conflicting
predictions in regard to how managers should allo-
cate corporate resources among the different stake-
holders of the firm. The shareholder view predicts
that corporate attention to stakeholders decreases
with stronger takeover protection. Because the
takeover market disciplines otherwise opportunis-
tic managers (Jensen and Ruback, 1983), takeover
protection facilitates managerial self-dealing and
deviation from the goal to maximize shareholder
value. As managers engage in self-serving activi-
ties, shareholder value declines (e.g., Karpoff and
Malatesta, 1989; Mahoney and Mahoney, 1993;
Pound, 1987) reducing the amount of resources
available to cater to the interests of non-share-
holding stakeholders (Jensen, 2002). In contrast,
the stakeholder model predicts that managers will
be more inclined to attend to non-shareholding
stakeholders when protected from takeover threats.
Because CEOs focus on short-term horizons when
threatened by a hostile takeover, they will refrain
from catering to non-shareholding stakeholders, an
investment conducive to the creation of long-term
shareholder value (e.g., Shleifer and Summers,
1988; Stein, 1988).
The present study focuses on the enhancement
of the Delaware takeover protection as an empir-
ical setting to understand how protection from
hostile takeovers impacts corporate attention to
stakeholders. Delaware-incorporated firms experi-
enced greater immunity to hostile takeovers when
several court decisions jointly weakened the tra-
ditionally takeover-friendly regime in the mid-
1990s. The shift in the Delaware takeover regime
provides an ideal setting to study the effect of
takeover protection on corporate attention to stake-
holders, because Delaware court decisions proxy
for a shift in power from shareholders to managers.
While firm-specific governance measures, such as
insider ownership, adoption of poison pills, clas-
sified boards, and dual voting rights are endoge-
nously determined by the firm, the change in legal
takeover protection is an exogenous shock that
affects all firms incorporated in the state of juris-
diction. Therefore, the joint effect of Delaware
court cases represents a unique natural experiment
that helps mitigate endogeneity concerns pertinent
to governance measures used in prior research.
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
The purpose of the firm: shareholder and
stakeholder paradigms
Two theoretical paradigms—the shareholder and
stakeholder models—are most relevant to explain-
ing how corporations attend to the interests of their
stakeholders. The two models share their under-
standings of value creation as the process that
aims to maximize the welfare of both sharehold-
ers and non-shareholding stakeholders, but differ
in their prescriptions of how to achieve that goal.
The shareholder view posits that managers should
focus on maximizing shareholder wealth in order
to maximize the sum of the welfare of all stake-
holders. The stakeholder view, in contrast, argues
that stakeholder welfare is maximized when man-
agers attend directly to all stakeholders without
prioritizing the interests of some over the others.
Recent interpretations of stakeholder theory further
suggest that the shareholder paradigm is subsumed
in a broader stakeholder view that admits multiple
objective functions (Freeman et al., 2004; Freeman
et al., 2007a). Shareholders represent one of the
many stakeholders whose interests are supported
by the firm to create value for society. Some firms
create value in a narrow way by attending only
to shareholders, while other firms create value in
a broader way by attending to shareholders and
non-shareholding stakeholders.
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Although catering to one stakeholder benefits
other stakeholders when the interests of all stake-
holders are aligned, making trade-offs among dif-
ferent stakeholders is necessary when their interests
conflict. Conflicting interests are most salient in
the context of hostile takeovers that benefit share-
holders in the short term via above-market stock
price premium (Jarrell, Brickley, and Netter, 1988;
Jensen and Ruback, 1983), while decreasing the
welfare of other stakeholders (Hirsch, 1987;
Shleifer and Summers, 1988). The wave of hostile
takeovers in the 1980s generated widespread pub-
lic concerns regarding the detrimental effects that
takeovers had on nonowner stakeholders (Allen,
1992; Millon, 1990), raising the fundamental ques-
tion about the purpose of the corporation and
its rightful claimants. Hence, the present study
focuses on the hostile takeover context to under-
stand how managers allocate resources among dif-
ferent stakeholders of the firm when the interests
of shareholders and other stakeholders conflict. In
the following section, I argue that the shareholder
and stakeholder views yield opposite predictions
about the impact of hostile takeovers on corporate
attention to stakeholders.
The shareholder paradigm
The shareholder model regards maximization of
shareholder value as an objective that ultimately
enhances the welfare of all stakeholders. The core
argument that creating shareholder value alone
benefits all other stakeholders rests on three key
assumptions. First, the firm is a nexus of con-
tracts between the corporation as a legal fic-
tion and its stakeholders (Easterbrook and Fischel,
1991; Eisenhardt, 1989; Fama and Jensen, 1983;
Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The shareholder view
assumes that contracts between the firm and the
non-shareholding stakeholders are complete. This
implies that all future contingencies can be spec-
ified by the contractual relationship with the firm
(Tirole, 2001). Consequently, top management has
no additional obligation to attend to those stake-
holders, as their welfare is already protected by
the contracts with the firm. Shareholders, in con-
trast, bear the residual risk and are thus protected
by holding the control rights. Unlike stakehold-
ers, shareholders have an implicit contract with
the firm that amounts to their claim on the firm’s
residual profits and assets (Easterbrook and Fis-
chel, 1991; Williamson, 1985). Hence, manage-
ment should attend to shareholders’ interests that
are not protected otherwise.
The second theoretical assumption underlying
the shareholder view suggests that focusing directly
on more than one stakeholder requires multitask-
ing and thus impedes the efficient creation of value
for all stakeholders. Maximization of shareholder
wealth provides a single metric that represents
an optimal tool to orient managerial actions and
to enhance the welfare of shareholders and non-
shareholding stakeholders alike (Jensen, 2002).
The third assumption states that the stock market
values the corporation’s future economic perfor-
mance in a rational and unbiased fashion (Fama,
1970). If managers pursue goals other than max-
imizing shareholder value, the stock market will
react adversely, subsequently reducing the welfare
of all stakeholders.
The shareholder model, as described above, has
important implications for understanding how gov-
ernance affects corporate attention to stakehold-
ers. Though the model leaves the creation of
shareholder value in managers’ hands, it assumes
that the interests of managers and stockholders
diverge; satisfying stockholders’ claims requires
maximization of shareholder value, while satisfy-
ing management’s claims requires maximization of
managers’ utility function, through the pursuit of
power, remuneration, or social status (Jensen and
Meckling, 1976). The takeover market acts as a
control device that curbs managers’ self-indulgent
decision making. If managers deviate from maxi-
mizing shareholder wealth, the stock price of their
firms will decline, facilitating a hostile takeover
that leads to the dismissal of the incumbent man-
agement (Manne, 1965).
Although limited empirical evidence exists to
support the theoretical claim that the market for
corporate control effectively eliminates inefficient
CEOs (e.g., Walsh and Ellwood, 1991), hostile
takeovers nevertheless discipline incumbent
mangers in their pursuit of shareholder value,
posing a threat to managers’ employment and
reputation. Takeover protection reduces the dis-
ciplining influence of takeover threats, triggering
thereby managerial self-dealing. As the stock mar-
ket reacts adversely to the self-dealing behavior
of the incumbent management, the value of firms
subject to takeover protection will decline. For
example, Karpoff and Malatesta (1989), Mahoney
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and Mahoney (1993), Pound (1987), and Ryngaert
(1988) find that shareholder value decreases after
firms adopt takeover protection devices. Karpoff
and Malatesta (1995) also document that Pennsyl-
vania corporations lost $4 billion in shareholder
value after the state passed antitakeover legisla-
tion in the 1990s. Shareholder theorists further
predict that, as the value of the firm declines,
fewer resources will be available to cater to the
demands of non-shareholding stakeholders, and
those stakeholders will receive a smaller portion
of a smaller pie.
In sum, the shareholder model of the firm posits
that value for all stakeholders is created most
efficiently when managers attend to sharehold-
ers’ interests, based on the three assumptions:
(1) the interests of non-shareholding stakeholders
are secured via contracts with the firm; (2) man-
agers are better at managing a single objective
function than multiple objective functions; and
(3) the stock market reacts adversely to managerial
deviation from shareholder value maximization,
leading to a decline in the welfare of sharehold-
ers and other stakeholders. Corporate governance
mechanisms, such as the takeover market, lie at the
heart of the process of value maximization, pro-
viding an effective instrument to discipline oppor-
tunistic managers who deviate from the pursuit of
shareholder wealth. By relieving incumbent man-
agers from takeover threats, takeover protection
should lead to a decline in corporate attention to
shareholders and stakeholders alike.
Hypothesis 1a: An increase in takeover protec-
tion leads to a decrease in corporate attention
to stakeholders.
The stakeholder paradigm
The stakeholder model provides a competing pre-
diction about the impact of takeover protection on
corporate attention to stakeholders. Compared to
the shareholder model, stakeholder theory is built
around a different set of assumptions. Whereas the
shareholder view considers shareholders to be the
dominant group whose interests should be sup-
ported to maximize the value of the firm, the
stakeholder model contends that managers should
balance the interests of all stakeholders (Clark-
son, 1995; Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Free-
man, 1984; Freeman et al., 2007a; Jawahar and
McLaughlin 2001; Jones, 1995; Post et al., 2002).
The stakeholder paradigm assumes that the wel-
fare of non-shareholding stakeholders cannot be
secured via contracts with the firm. Contracts
between the firm and its stakeholders are incom-
plete, as they cannot anticipate all future con-
tingencies (Hill and Jones, 1992; Shleifer and
Summers, 1988). Hence, managers are responsible
for catering not only to shareholders, but also to
other corporate stakeholders.
Furthermore, unlike the shareholder view, the
stakeholder framework does not rely on a sin-
gle metric to guide managerial decisions. Stake-
holder theorists argue that having a single objective
enables managers to create value for shareholders
at the expense of other stakeholders. For exam-
ple, firms may fire workers, lower the working
standards, pollute the natural environment, and
decimate local communities in the pursuit of short-
term shareholder goals (Shleifer and Summers,
1988). Maximizing the welfare of all stakeholders
requires that managers balance and integrate mul-
tiple objectives and multiple stakeholders’ inter-
ests with no prima facie priority of one group of
stakeholders over another (Freeman et al., 2004;
Freeman et al., 2007a; Jones and Wicks, 1999).1
Attending to stakeholders’ interests may bene-
fit the firm not only in the short run but also in
the long run. Several theoretical views contend
that firms that satisfy stakeholders’ claims are able
to secure intangible resources that enhance firms’
ability to create value in the long term. For exam-
ple, catering to stakeholders has been documented
to enhance corporate reputation (Luo and Bhat-
tacharya, 2006; Schnietz and Epstein, 2005; Sen
and Bhattacharya, 2001). Resource-based schol-
ars argue that socially complex and difficult to
duplicate resources, such as reputation, legitimacy,
trust, and knowledge assets, can enhance and sus-
tain competitive advantage in the long run (Bar-
ney and Hansen, 1994; Hillman and Keim, 2001;
Teece, 1998). Furthermore, Turban and Greening
(1997) find that corporate attention to stakeholders
increases firms’ ability to attract and retain superior
human resources that have been shown to provide
organizations with a sustained competitive advan-
tage (Lado and Wilson, 1994; Pfeffer, 1994).
1 Although stakeholder theory eschews prima facie priority of
one group of stakeholders over another, trade-offs among stake-
holders may benefit others in the long run, but this must be
decided upon by the effected parties (Freeman Martin, and Par-
mar, 2007b; Jawahar and McLaughlin, 2001).
Copyright  2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Strat. Mgmt. J., 30: 261–285 (2009)
DOI: 10.1002/smj
266 A. Kacperczyk
Moreover, resource dependence theorists sug-
gest that a stakeholder-friendly orientation en-
hances long-term corporate success because stake-
holders hold the key to resources on which the firm
depends for its long-term survival (Caroll, 1989;
Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). The ‘instrumental per-
spective’ on stakeholder theory additionally con-
siders corporate attention to stakeholders a ‘wealth
creating capacity of the corporation’ that helps the
firm reduce and control costs over the long run
(Freeman, 1984: 255). Anecdotal evidence further
suggests that firms attend to stakeholders’ demands
in order to reap long-term benefits. For example,
the Whole Foods Market states in its Declaration
of Interdependence that ‘creating and nurturing this
community of stakeholders is critical to the long-
term success of our company.’2
That the stakeholder-friendly orientation may
enhance the value of the firm in the long term
has important implications for understanding how
takeover protection impacts corporate attention to
stakeholders. If corporate attention to stakehold-
ers is associated with long-term returns, man-
agers will be less likely to cater to stakehold-
ers’ demands when pressured to pursue short-term
goals. Below, I develop a theoretical argument to
suggest that the threat of hostile takeovers exerts
pressure on managers to focus on short- rather
than long-term outcomes. Conversely, managers
relieved from takeover threats are more likely to
make long-term investments, such as attending to
stakeholders’ interests.
Several lines of research indicate that CEOs
are likely to prioritize short- over long-term goals
when threatened by takeovers. For example, stud-
ies in organizational and social psychology have
documented that individuals tend to refrain from
long-term decision making if subjected to a threat.
In a series of studies, Gray (1999) finds that peo-
ple in threat-related negative emotional states favor
choices producing immediate outcomes. Staw,
Sandelands, and Dutton (1981) suggest that indi-
viduals operating under external threat, defined
as ‘an environmental event that has impending
negative or harmful consequences for the entity,’
experience restricted information processing, nar-
row field of attention and a limited repertoire of
solutions, all of which increase the probability of
2 The Whole Foods Market Declaration of Interdependence
can be found at http://www.wholefoodsmarket.com/company/
declaration.html (accessed 14 July 2006).
focusing on short-term rather than long-term goals
(Staw et al., 1981: 502). Studies of incomplete
contracts further argue that takeover threats lead
to a breach of trust between the firm and its man-
agement; shareholders are unable to offer credible
commitments that they will not tender shares to
a hostile raider likely to fire the incumbent man-
agement (Shleifer and Summers, 1988). Insecure
about their long-term employment, managers will
privilege short-term outcomes and refrain from
making long-term decisions.
Finally, the myopic market view indicates that
managers refrain from long-term investments
because the stock market consistently underval-
ues long-term outcomes (e.g., Charkham, 1994;
Sykes, 1994). Benefits that accrue to the firm in
the long run are more difficult to evaluate by share-
holders, because they are associated with greater
uncertainty and information asymmetry (Froot,
Scharstein, and Stein, 1992; Laverty, 1996). The
threat of hostile takeovers forces otherwise
forward-looking managers to prioritize short-term
profits that boost the current share price in order
to avoid undervaluation of the firm’s stock by the
market, and to prevent the purchase of the firm
on the cheap by a hostile acquirer (Drucker, 1986;
Stein, 1988). Hence, when threatened by hostile
takeovers, managers will be less likely to attend to
stakeholders to eschew a potential undervaluation
of their investments.
Together, these lines of research suggest that
managers tend to have short-term horizons when
faced with takeover threats. Because attending
to the interests of non-shareholding stakeholders
enhances the long-term value of the firm, top man-
agers will be less inclined to cater to stakeholders
under a takeover threat. Conversely, takeover pro-
tection will shift managers’ focus from short- to
long-term outcomes, resulting in higher manage-
rial attention to stakeholders. Integrating the above
arguments leads to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1b: An increase in takeover protec-
tion leads to an increase in corporate attention
to stakeholders.
Attention to stakeholders: a long-term
investment, or a form of managerial
self-dealing?
Whereas stakeholder theory predicts that takeover
protection should increase corporate attention to
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stakeholders by setting managers free to invest in
the long term, an alternative explanation would
suggest that CEOs attend to stakeholders to derive
private benefits, and will be more inclined to
pursue such goals when shielded from takeover
threats. Agency theorists regard managerial atten-
tion to non-shareholding stakeholders as a self-
motivated managerial perquisite that advances
managers’ private goals while draining corpo-
rate resources. Managers attend to stakeholders
to garner private benefits, such as friendship,
love, and respect (Jensen and Meckling, 1976),
to enhance social status, and to contribute to per-
sonal prestige, social standing in the community,
and upward social mobility in local elite circles
(Atkinson and Galaskiewicz, 1988; Galaskiewicz,
1985; 1997). Attention to stakeholders enables
‘self-interested managers. . . to pursue their own
interests at the expense of society and the firm’s
financial claimants. It allows managers and direc-
tors to invest in their favorite projects that destroy
firm-value whatever they are (the environment, art,
cities, medical research) without having to justify
the value destruction (Jensen, 2002: 242). Agency
theory further predicts that managerial self-dealing
arises when governance is too weak to limit the
use of corporate assets by managers (Jensen and
Meckling, 1976). Hence, stronger takeover protec-
tion should lead to a greater managerial attention
to stakeholders.
This study is an attempt to tease out two mech-
anisms—relief from short-termism derived from
stakeholder theory, and managerial self-dealing
derived from the agency view. To that end, I
examine the impact of takeover protection on long-
term shareholder value. Relief from short-termism
and self-dealing are a source of opposite predic-
tions in regard to the effect of corporate atten-
tion to stakeholders on shareholder value. If relief
from short-termism accounts for an increase in
corporate attention to stakeholders under stronger
takeover protection, long-term shareholder value
should increase, as the stock market incorporates
the value of previously undervalued investments.
This leads to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2a: Firms that increase their atten-
tion to stakeholders following an increase in
takeover protection will have higher long-term
stock market value than firms that do not
increase their attention to stakeholders.
In contrast, agency theory predicts that man-
agerial self-dealing and perquisite consumption
increase agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976),
leading to a decline in shareholder value (Jensen
and Meckling, 1976; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).
For example, Yermack (2006) finds that per-
sonal use of a company’s aircraft by the CEO
affects adversely its stock value. If self-dealing
is the mechanism underlying the relation between
takeover protection and corporate attention to
stakeholders, the future stock market value should
decline for firms that increase their attention to
non-shareholding stakeholders under stronger take-
over protection.
Hypothesis 2b: Firms that increase their atten-
tion to stakeholders following an increase in
takeover protection will have lower long-term
stock market value than firms that do not
increase their attention to stakeholders.
METHODS
Empirical background
Prior empirical attempts to study the effect of gov-
ernance and corporate attention to stakeholders
have been plagued by concerns about endogeneity.
Specifically, the relation between governance and
corporate attention to stakeholders is subject to the
problem of reverse causality—the relation may be
significant not because governance impacts firms’
attention to stakeholders’ demands, but because
firms’ attention to stakeholders shapes the qual-
ity and structure of their governance mechanisms.
If not addressed, endogeneity may pose method-
ological and conceptual challenges. For example,
endogenous relations may bias coefficients by dis-
torting their magnitude or by showing a signifi-
cant relation when none exist (Wooldridge, 2001).
Moreover, inferring the direction of causality and
establishing causal mechanisms can be conceptu-
ally and methodologically difficult when reverse
causality is present.
Prior studies have been limited in their attempts
to reduce endogenity bias. Though informative,
those studies have focused largely on endogenous
governance measures—board composition, insider
ownership, or executive compensation (e.g., Cof-
fey and Wang, 1998; Deckop, Merriman, and
Gupta, 2006; Johnson and Greening, 1999; Zahra
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et al., 1993)—that pose a challenge for interpret-
ing the findings. For example, insider ownership
may increase corporate attention to stakeholders,
because managers with higher equity holdings
have more power vis-à-vis outside shareholders
and are more likely to use their discretion to buy
off stakeholders’ support (e.g., Zahra et al., 1993).
However, insiders may also increase their own-
ership in more stakeholder-friendly firms, expect-
ing those firms to perform better in the long
run. In another example, outside board represen-
tation increases firms’ attention to stakeholders
because outside directors are more inclined to
recognize and advance the interests of different
non-shareholding constituencies (e.g., Johnson and
Greening, 1999). Yet an alternative explanation
would suggest that stakeholder-friendly firms are
more likely to appoint outside directors to legit-
imize their pro-stakeholder orientation.
This study seeks to overcome the limitations
of prior research by using a natural experiment
that can effectively mitigate endogeneity bias
(Wooldridge, 2001). Specifically, I focus on
several court decisions in the mid-1990s that
reduced the threat of hostile takeovers in Delaware.
The impact of the Delaware change in takeover
protection represents an exogenous shock to firms
incorporated in that state after 1996. Moreover,
Delaware provides an ideal empirical setting
because half of all publicly traded companies,
and even a greater share of the large publicly
traded companies, are incorporated in Delaware
(Romano, 1993). Regardless of the location of
their physical plants, all Delaware-based firms
experienced stronger legal protection from hostile
takeovers when several decisions made by the
Delaware court jointly reduced takeover threats
(Subramanian, 2002).3
3 The takeover-friendly Delaware regime began to experience a
gradual change beginning in 1985, when the courts upheld the
poison pill in the case of Moran v. Household International,
Inc. (500 A. 2d 1346 [Del. 1985]), and in 1989 when the
case of Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time-Warner (571
A.2d 1140 [Del. 1989]) allowed Warner Brothers to retain its
poison pill in the face of a hostile takeover. However, these two
events provided a mild protection against hostile takeovers—the
legislation, which upheld the poison pill, contained caveats as
to the extent of the poison pill application. For example, Moran
v. Householder International (1985) stated that targets did not
have ‘unfettered discretion’ to use poison pills (500 A. 2d 1346
[Del. 1985]: 1355), and the Time-Warner (1989) case was a far
from clear pill decision that became extended only in the course
of takeover contests in the mid-1990s (Subramanian, 2004).
Three hostile takeover contests, together known
as the YWC trilogy (Younkers, Wallace, and
Circon)—Carson Pirie Scott & Co. v. Younkers
(1994), Moore v. Wallace Computer (1995), and
U.S. Surgical v. Circon (1996)—conferred stron-
ger immunity to takeover attempts on firms that
had already adopted internal takeover defenses.
Specifically, the court cases extended the poison
pill—a takeover defense that enables sharehold-
ers to purchase shares at a discount to the current
market price to dilute the equity ownership of the
hostile party—to firms with staggered board pro-
visions that delay gaining control of the board by
the hostile raider and allow only a fraction of direc-
tors to stand for election in a given year (Daines,
2001; Subramanian, 2002; 2004). Because these
three takeover defenses work most effectively in
conjunction, they enabled Delaware-incorporated
firms with staggered boards to implement a poi-
son pill defense, even when the bidder had already
won the first proxy contest (Bebchuk, Coates, and
Subramanian, 2002). Target firms could now keep
their poison pills in place and use the ‘just-say-no
defense’ against would-be acquirers, regardless of
the market premiums these acquirers were willing
to pay to shareholders (Abelson, 1996).4
Although the change in the Delaware takeover
regime has numerous advantages as an empirical
setting in which to examine the impact of takeover
protection on corporate attention to stakeholders,
its relevance may be challenged by the claim
that hostile takeover bids occurred rarely in the
1990s. Much research indicates that by the 1990s,
hostile takeovers became ‘friendly deals,’ leading
the takeover era of the 1980s’ to an end (Davis
and Thompson, 1994; Jensen, 2000). I argue that,
though less frequent, hostile takeovers neverthe-
less posed a substantial threat to incumbent man-
agers in the 1990s. For example, Comment and
Schwert (1995) suggest that the decreased number
of actual deals does not provide sufficient basis
to conclude that managers were less threatened
by hostile takeovers in the 1990s compared to
the 1980s. Contrary to a popular belief about a
4 The magnitude of the impact of the legal change in the
Delaware takeover regime has been broadly documented in legal
and financial research. For example, Delaware court decisions
decreased employee ownership shares and managerial holdings,
and led to a decline in the ‘value-gap’ between companies
incorporated inside and outside of Delaware (Daines, 2001;
Subramanian 2002; 2004).
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clear dichotomization between friendly and hos-
tile takeovers, most deals made in the 1990s were
indistinguishable in economic terms, except that
hostile transactions involved publicity as part of
the bargaining process (Schwert, 2000). Anecdo-
tal evidence further shows a continued influence
of takeover threats on top managers in the 1990s.
For example, the founders and managers of Google
Inc. justified their decision to retain the majority
of the voting rights by evoking the necessity to
shield the firm from a hostile takeover. Together,
the existing studies and anecdotal evidence suggest
that hostile takeovers remained a threat to incum-
bent managers in the 1990s.
Data and sample
The study uses the Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini
& Co. (KLD) data to measure corporate atten-
tion to stakeholders. KLD offers multidimensional
measures of corporate attention to stakeholders
(Hillman and Keim, 2001) that have been exten-
sively used by researchers and practitioners alike
(Berman et al., 1999; Deckop et al., 2006; Graves
and Waddock, 1994). KLD is a social choice
investment advisory firm that relies on indepen-
dent rating experts to assess how well compa-
nies address the demands of their stakeholders
based on multiple data sources including annual
questionnaires sent to company’s investor rela-
tions office, firms’ financial statements, annual and
quarterly reports, general press releases, govern-
ment surveys, and academic journal publications.
The KLD index compiles annual ratings of 650
publicly traded U.S. firms: 500 are part of the
Standard & Poor’s (S&P) 500 index, and 150 addi-
tional firms are included in the Domini 400 Social
Index (DSI).5 This study uses data collected for
the period between 1991 and 2002. The final sam-
ple represents an unbalanced panel of 878 firms,
including a treatment group of 221 Delaware-
incorporated firms with staggered boards and a
5 The DSI is constructed based on the following rules: it includes
250 S&P 500 companies, 100 non-S&P 500 companies cho-
sen for sector diversification and market capitalization, and 50
additional companies with exemplary social and environmen-
tal records. Companies may be removed from the DSI due to
corporate actions, violation of exclusionary screens, or poor
social or environmental performance. Companies involved in
alcohol, tobacco, firearms, gambling, nuclear power, and mil-
itary weapons are ineligible for inclusion in the DSI; however,
such companies may be included in the sample through the S&P
500 index.
control group of 657 companies with no staggered
board, or incorporated outside Delaware.
Dependent variables
KLD rates companies on a range of dimensions
that reflect how well they cater to community,
corporate governance, diversity (to proxy for
minorities), the natural environment, human rights,
product quality (to proxy for customers), and
whether firms’ operations are related to alco-
hol, gambling, firearms, nuclear power, and mil-
itary contracting. For each dimension, strengths
and concerns are measured to evaluate positive
and negative aspects of corporate action toward
stakeholders. I focus on five KLD dimensions
consistently reported between 1991 and 2002:
community, minorities, employees, the natural
environment, and customers. These dimensions
have been selected because they reflect corpo-
rate attention to primary stakeholders that impact
firms’ survival (Clarkson, 1995; Freeman, 1984)
and exert considerable influence on corporate strat-
egy (Prahalad and Hamel, 1994).
Corporate attention to stakeholders
The main dependent variable measures the over-
all corporate attention to stakeholders and is con-
structed by aggregating the strengths across the
five selected dimensions to obtain a score of total
strengths.6 Because 53 percent of the scores take
the value of 0 or 1, I use a binary dependent vari-
able equal to 1 if the firm has been rated as having
at least one strength across the five dimensions
considered, and 0 otherwise. For robustness, I use
a count dependent variable equal to the number of
total strengths and obtain even stronger results (see
Appendix, Table A1).
6 Prior studies have generally constructed a composite indicator
of corporate attention to stakeholders by subtracting the con-
cerns from the strengths. However, recent work has suggested
this specification to be methodologically questionable. Because
KLD’s strengths and concerns lack convergent validity, using
them in conjunction fails to provide valid measures of corpo-
rate attention to stakeholders (Johnson-Cramer, 2004; Mattingly
and Berman, 2006). Hence, this study uses aggregated strengths
rather than the difference between total strengths and concerns
as an indicator of corporate attention to stakeholders. For robust-
ness, I calculate a net score for each dimension by subtracting
total concerns from total strengths and summing the net scores
from each dimension. I find similar results.
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Corporate attention across different stakeholders
I use five additional dependent variables, each
measuring corporate attention to a different stake-
holder. Most prior studies have used the aggre-
gate KLD measure, with a few notable exceptions
(e.g., Berman et al., 1999; Hillman and Keim,
2001; Johnson and Greening, 1999). However,
more research is needed to understand how cor-
porations attend to different stakeholders (Hillman
and Keim, 2001). Thus, the study additionally
examines the effect of takeover protection on each
of the five stakeholders. To that end, I disaggre-
gate the measure of the overall corporate attention
to stakeholders. I use a binary dependent variable
equal to 1 if the score is greater or equal to 1, and
0 otherwise, for each stakeholder. For robustness, I
use a count variable to measure corporate attention
to each stakeholder. I use a Poisson model to esti-
mate the regression models and find qualitatively
similar results (see Appendix, Table A1).
Shareholder value
The market-to-book ratio (M/B) is used to calcu-
late shareholder value in the short term (one year
into the future: MBt+1) and in the long term (two
and three years into the future: MBt+2, and MBt+3).
Technically, M/B is measured as the sum of market
value of equity and book value of debt divided by
the book value of assets. Intuitively, the measure
equals the ratio of the firm’s market value (equity
plus debt) to the replacement cost of its physical
assets (book value of assets), and is high when the
firm has valuable intangible assets, such as man-
agerial skill, monopoly power, goodwill, or a stock
of patents, in addition to physical capital (Morck,
Shleifer, and Vishny, 1988). M/B is commonly
used to approximate Tobin’s Q (Lindenberg and
Ross, 1981). Though Q is often considered a noisy
signal of how well managers serve shareholders’
claims, it is a forward-looking market-based mea-
sure of financial performance that indicates the
market expectation of the present value of future
profits that the company will generate from the
current assets in place.
Explanatory variables
Takeover protection
The Delaware court decisions reduced the threat of
hostile takeovers for firms with staggered boards
and incorporated in Delaware after 1996. Thus, to
measure the threat of hostile takeovers, I use a
binary variable equal to 1 if (1) year is greater
or equal to1996, (2) the company has a stag-
gered board, and (3) the company is incorpo-
rated in Delaware; and 0 otherwise. Consistent
with prior literature, 1996 indicates the watershed
year when Delaware-based companies experienced
enhanced legal protection from takeovers (Subra-
manian, 2004). I check for the sensitivity of this
date by examining trends in corporate attention to
stakeholders prior to 1996. To this end, I construct
a dummy variable (pre-change) equal to 1 if the
company has a staggered board and is incorporated
in Delaware two or three years before the change
in the Delaware takeover regime (in 1993 or in
1994); and 0 otherwise. The state of incorporation
and the presence of staggered board provisions are
determined via Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003)
measures constructed using the Investor Responsi-
bility Research Center (IRRC) data on corporate
governance. I find no significant relation between
the pre-change variable and corporate attention to
stakeholders, which provides further evidence that
the validation of the poison pill came into effect
in the mid-1990s (see Appendix, Table A2).
Control variables
Given that the main independent variable—take-
over protection—represents an interaction of three
variables, those variables must be separately
included as controls in the regression models. I
include the staggered board variable, equal to 1
if a firm has a staggered board and 0 otherwise,
to control for the presence of a staggered board
provision in the corporate charter. The Delaware
incorporation variable, equal to 1 if the firm
is incorporated in Delaware and 0 otherwise, is
included to control for Delaware incorporation.
The post 96 variable, equal to 1 if the observation
year is greater or equal to 1996 and 0 otherwise,
is included to control for economy-wide events
occurring in and after 1996. The three binary vari-
ables are observed annually.
Furthermore, pension fund and insider owner-
ship are included in the regression models to con-
trol for alternative governance mechanisms. Since
pension funds hold a relatively large proportion of
the firms’ stock, they are better equipped to effec-
tively monitor incumbent management (Shleifer
and Vishny, 1986). Hence, as managers become
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more accountable to shareholders, they may be
less inclined to attend to social issues that deviate
from shareholder objectives. In contrast, because
pension funds focus on long-term performance
of the companies they own (Pound, 1988), firms
with higher concentration of ownership by pension
funds should experience more pressure to attend to
non-shareholding stakeholders. I measure pension
fund ownership as the percentage of stocks owned
by the pension fund with the largest share.7 Share-
holders of pension funds are identified using a list
of pension fund names and their corresponding
institutional manager numbers (Dittmar and Mahrt-
Smith, 2007). This list is subsequently matched
with annual institutional ownership data provided
by Thomson Financial.
Insider ownership may motivate managers to
maximize shareholder value at the expense of other
stakeholders, as it aligns the incentives of both
shareholders and managers. Conversely, because
insider ownership shields incumbent managers
from the takeover market, executives with equity
holdings should increase their support for diverse
stakeholders in pursuit of long-term goals. I mea-
sure insider ownership as the sum of shares in
the company held by corporate insiders divided by
the total number of shares outstanding. Corporate
insiders include those having access to nonpublic,
material, inside information. Insiders are identifi-
able because they are required to file Securities
and Exchange Commission forms (3rd, 4th, and
5th) when trading their company’s stock. Data on
insider ownership report the number of shares held
by corporate insiders, excluding stock options, and
are drawn from Thomson Financial Insider hold-
ings.
I further control for other forms of takeover pro-
tection, such as firm-specific takeover defenses.
Intuitively, if firms are already protected from hos-
tile takeovers by firm-specific antitakeover mea-
sures, I should find no significant relation between
the Delaware takeover protection and corporate
attention to stakeholders. To account for those
alternative takeover defenses, I include the Gov-
ernance Index as a control variable (Gompers
et al., 2003). The Governance Index counts the
number of antitakeover measures falling broadly
7 For robustness, I use the sum of holdings of all pension funds
and find similar results.
into five distinct groups: tactics for delaying hos-
tile bidders (Delay), voting rights (Voting), direc-
tor/officer protection (Protection), other takeover
defenses (Other), and state laws (State). Higher
values of the index indicate greater corporate
immunity to takeover threats.
Finally, I control for corporate characteristics—
book leverage, performance, and size—that may
influence corporate attention to stakeholders (Wad-
dock and Graves, 1997). Book leverage is mea-
sured annually as the total book value of debt
divided by the book value of total assets. Size
is measured annually as the natural logarithm of
sales. Performance is measured annually as the
return on assets indicated by the ratio of earnings
before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortiza-
tion (EBITDA) to total assets. All measures are
drawn from Compustat.
Shareholder vs. stakeholder models: model
specification
I examine the effect of takeover protection on cor-
porate attention to stakeholders with the difference-
in-differences (DD) method, widely used to assess
the influence of policy and law changes (Bertrand
and Mullainathan, 2003). The DD method is simi-
lar to the matched-sample (MS) method—it com-
pares the treatment group (firms affected by the
law) to the control group (firms not affected by the
law), while holding other variables constant. How-
ever, because the MS approach allows for match-
ing only on a limited number of firm characteris-
tics (e.g., size), it may lead to a sample selection
bias, as the sample size becomes artificially and
arbitrarily restricted. The DD method, in contrast,
allows for a comparison across all firms’ charac-
teristics and the use of the entire universe of firms
both in the treatment and control groups, reducing
a coefficient bias that may arise from a nonran-
dom sample selection. The DD approach can be
intuitively understood as a comparison of corpo-
rate attention to stakeholders between Delaware-
incorporated firms with staggered boards (the treat-
ment sample) before and after 1996, and firms
without staggered boards, or incorporated outside
of Delaware (the control sample) before and after
1996. Thus, I compare the difference in corporate
attention to stakeholders of the treatment sample
before and after 1996 to the difference in atten-
tion to stakeholders of the control sample before
and after 1996. The difference in these differences
Copyright  2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Strat. Mgmt. J., 30: 261–285 (2009)
DOI: 10.1002/smj
272 A. Kacperczyk
serves as the estimate of the effect of Delaware
court decisions on corporate attention to stakehold-
ers.
The following random effects logistic regres-
sion model is estimated to examine the effect of
takeover protection on corporate attention to stake-
holders:
Pr(yiskt = 1) = F(αt + βi + γ Dt + δPOiskt
+ λGIMiskt + µ IOiskt + η Xiskt + εiskt )
where i indexes firms, s indexes the state of
incorporation, k indexes the state of location, t
indexes time, yiskt is the dependent variable equal
to 1 if the sum of the strengths that measure
attention toward stakeholders is greater than 0,
and 0 otherwise. The main explanatory variable Dt
equals 1 if a firm is incorporated in Delaware, has
a staggered board, and t is greater or equal to 1996.
POiskt measures the percentage of stock ownership
of the pension fund that has the largest share
in the firm, IOiskt measures the sum of insider
equity holdings, and GIMiskt is the Governance
Index (Gompers et al., 2003) that measures the
number of other takeover protections for firm i.
The vector of control variables, Xiskt , includes
size, performance, leverage, and the three binary
variables that measure separately whether a firm is
incorporated in Delaware, the year of incorporation
is greater or equal to 1996, and whether the firm
has a staggered board provision in its charter.
To address concerns related to unobserved het-
erogeneity and autocorrelation, firm-random
effects (βi) and time-fixed effects (αt ) are used.8
Moreover, the state of location and the state of
incorporation tend to differ, reducing the concern
that a change in economic conditions in the state
of location is a third factor that accounts for both
the passage of the law and the change in corporate
attention to stakeholders. Finding a positive sign
8 Due to a nonlinear nature of the logistic function, firm-fixed
effects would lead to an exclusion from the sample of those
firms for which KLD ratings are time invariant. Because such
exclusion would produce biased estimates, firm-fixed effects
cannot be used. Instead, I use firm-random effects to control
for unobserved heterogeneity, consistent with the results of
the Hausman test (Hausman, 1978). For robustness, I replace
the binary variable for each stakeholder, with an alternative
specification of the dependent variable—equal to log (1 + sum
(strengths)). This count variable, commonly used in industrial
organization and strategy research (e.g., Kortum and Lerner,
2000), indicates the sum of strengths. I estimate OLS regressions
with firm-fixed effects, and find qualitatively similar results.
of coefficient estimate of the Delaware takeover
protection would provide support for the hypoth-
esis derived from stakeholder theory (Hypothesis
1b), suggesting that a Delaware-incorporated firm
with a staggered board after 1996 is γ times more
likely to attend to its stakeholders, as compared to
its counterpart in the control sample. Conversely,
finding a negative coefficient estimate would pro-
vide support for the hypothesis derived from the
shareholder view (Hypothesis 1a), suggesting that
a Delaware-incorporated firm with a staggered
board after 1996 is γ times less likely to attend
to its stakeholders, as compared to its counterpart
in the control sample.
Attention to stakeholders: a long-term
investment, or a form of managerial
self-dealing?
This study further attempts to tease out relief
from short-termism and managerial self-dealing.
To that end, I examine the joint effect of the
takeover protection and corporate attention to
stakeholders on shareholder value, measured by
the market-to-book ratio. I use ordinary least
squares (OLS) regression models with firm- and
year-fixed effects. A positive coefficient on the
interaction term will provide support for relief
from short-termism, implying that long-term share-
holder value increases for firms more likely to
attend to stakeholders (Hypothesis 2a). Conversely,
a negative coefficient on the interaction term will
provide support for the self-dealing hypothesis,
which predicts a decrease in shareholder value
for firms that increase their attention to stakehold-




Table 1 shows descriptive statistics (Panel A) and
correlations (Panel B) for the dependent variables
and the explanatory variables. Overall, 70 percent
of firms in the KLD sample have been rated as pay-
ing attention to stakeholders. Twenty-six percent
have been rated as paying attention to community,
39 percent to minorities, 22 percent to the natural
environment, 34 percent to employees, and 15 per-
cent to customers. Fifty-five percent of firms are
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Table 1. Panel A. Descriptive statistics
Variables Mean SD Min Max
Stakeholders 0.698 0.459 0 1
Community 0.264 0.441 0 1
Minorities 0.388 0.487 0 1
Environment 0.217 0.413 0 1
Employees 0.341 0.474 0 1
Customers 0.154 0.361 0 1
Takeover protection 0.150 0.357 0 1
Post 96 0.664 0.472 0 1
Staggered board 0.607 0.488 0 1
Delaware incorporation 0.552 0.497 0 1
Governance Index 9.685 2.681 1 16
Leverage 0.247 0.180 0 0.8
Performance (ROA) 0.143 0.105 −1.184 1.070
Size (Sales) 7378.0 15451.2 0.0 245308.0
Pension fund ownership 1.667 2.700 0.000 41.843
Insider ownership 0.366 0.482 0.000 1.000
Shareholder value (M/B) 1.680 1.816 0.016 38.9
Total current compensation 1628.2 1542.5 0.0 43511.5
incorporated in Delaware, 60 percent have stag-
gered boards, 66 percent are observed after 1996,
and 15 percent satisfy all three criteria. A firm
has, on average, a leverage of 0.25, and return
on assets of 14.3 percent. The pension fund with
the largest share owns 1.67 percent of the firm’s
stock on average, and the sum of the stock owner-
ship of all insiders equals on average 36.7 percent.
The main dependent (stakeholders) and indepen-
dent (takeover protection) variables are positively
correlated. Except for leverage and the Gover-
nance Index, all control variables correlate posi-
tively with the dependent variable.
Shareholder vs. stakeholder models:
multivariate analysis
Table 2 presents the results estimated using firm-
random effects regressions to test the hypothe-
sized relation between takeover protection and cor-
porate attention to stakeholders. Model 1 shows
the estimates for the effect of takeover protection
on the overall corporate attention to stakehold-
ers, while Models 2–6 present estimates for the
effect of takeover protection on corporate atten-
tion across different stakeholders. In each model,
the coefficients on the Takeover protection variable
discriminate the hypothesized negative (Hypoth-
esis 1a) vs. positive (Hypothesis 1b) effect of
takeover protection on corporate attention to stake-
holders. Takeover protection leads to an increase
in the overall corporate attention to stakehold-
ers (Model 1), corporate attention to community
(Model 2), and to the natural environment (Model
4), but it has no effect on corporate attention to
minorities (Model 3), employees (Model 5), and
customers (Model 6). In the subsequent section, I
conduct additional analyses to further understand
the mechanisms underlying these findings. Over-
all, the results presented in Table 2 provide support
for the stakeholder (Hypothesis 1b) vs. shareholder
paradigm (Hypothesis 1a), showing that compa-
nies with staggered boards and incorporated in
Delaware are more likely to increase their attention
to stakeholders’ demands following an increase in
takeover protection, as compared to the control
group of firms. A negative effect of takeover pro-
tection on corporate attention to stakeholders, as
predicted by the shareholder view, does not find
support in any of the regression models. All results
are robust to the use of a count measure as an
alternative specification of the dependent variable
(Table A1).
Table 2 also shows that pension fund owner-
ship is positively related to corporate attention to
stakeholders, in line with the results from previous
studies (Graves and Waddock, 1994; Johnson and
Greening, 1999). Due to a large portfolio owner-
ship, pension funds are less likely to divest stocks
without affecting the stock price (Pound, 1988)
and they may, therefore, take greater interest in












































































































































































































































































































































1 firms’ returns over a long period of time. Insider
ownership exhibits a significant positive associa-
tion with corporate attention to customers, suggest-
ing that managers with high ownership stakes are
more likely to cater to stakeholders. The Gover-
nance Index is positively correlated with corpo-
rate attention to community. Including the index
in the models further strengthens the precision
of the coefficient that estimates the effect of the
Delaware takeover protection on corporate atten-
tion to stakeholders, and shows that the change
in the Delaware takeover regime has a significant
predictive power above and beyond firm-specific
takeover defenses.
Performance is positively associated with the
overall attention to stakeholders (Model 1), and
more specifically, with firms’ attention to minori-
ties (Model 3), employees (Model 5), and cus-
tomers (Model 6). A negative association is found
between performance and corporate attention to
the natural environment (Model 4). Broadly, these
results are consistent with the line of research that
documents a positive relation between attention
to stakeholders and financial performance (e.g.,
Waddock and Graves, 1997). Financial leverage
shows a significant negative association with cor-
porate attention to employees and customers, and
a positive association with attention to the natural
environment. Consistent with Titman (1984), these
findings suggest that financially constrained firms
concerned with meeting their future obligations are
less likely to provide support for employees and to
attend to customers. Firm size is positively asso-
ciated with corporate attention to stakeholders in
all models, indicating that larger firms are more
likely than smaller firms to cater to stakehold-
ers’ interests. Larger firms may take advantage of
economies of scale and cater to stakeholders with
funds that represent a smaller percentage of their
total assets. Larger firms are also more likely to
become the target of social activists, policymak-
ers, socially responsible institutional investors, and
stakeholders, in general.
A long-term investment or a form of
managerial self-dealing? Multivariate analysis
I now conduct a test to distinguish between relief
from short-termism and self-dealing. Relief from
short-termism suggests that those firms that in-
crease their corporate attention to stakeholders
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Takeover protection 0.507∗ 1.402∗∗∗ 0.421 1.207∗∗∗ 0.097 0.336
(0.263) (0.258) (0.263) (0.257) (0.226) (0.295)
Post 96 1.091∗∗∗ −0.404 1.859∗∗∗ 0.385 1.230∗∗∗ 0.432
(0.312) (0.333) (0.357) (0.336) (0.308) (0.390)
Staggered board 0.223 −0.244 −0.060 0.368 0.144 0.135
(0.291) (0.292) (0.284) (0.292) (0.270) (0.304)
Delaware incorporation −0.650∗∗ −1.234∗∗∗ −0.403 −0.689∗∗ −0.127 −0.336
(0.279) (0.284) (0.272) (0.284) (0.263) (0.286)
Governance Index 0.039 0.118∗∗ −0.036 −0.011 −0.076 −0.003
(0.050) (0.052) (0.048) (0.052) (0.047) (0.053)
Leverage −0.577 0.899 −0.868 3.149∗∗∗ −1.233∗∗ −2.598∗∗∗
(0.624) (0.637) (0.618) (0.639) (0.579) (0.715)
Performance 2.334∗∗ 0.480 2.241∗∗ −2.246∗∗ 1.667∗ 2.086∗
(1.100) (1.075) (1.032) (1.121) (0.945) (1.222)
Size 0.649∗∗∗ 1.043∗∗∗ 0.872∗∗∗ 0.305∗∗∗ 0.597∗∗∗ 0.375∗∗∗
(0.113) (0.107) (0.104) (0.100) (0.100) (0.109)
Pension fund ownership 0.352∗∗∗ 0.184∗∗∗ 0.255∗∗∗ 0.043 0.107∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗
(0.077) (0.039) (0.060) (0.029) (0.039) (0.039)
Insider ownership −0.232 −0.126 0.070 −0.286∗ −0.041 0.456∗∗
(0.158) (0.167) (0.156) (0.172) (0.146) (0.187)
Observations 4538 4538 4538 4538 4538 4538
Number of firms 878 878 878 878 878 878
Log likelihood −1627 −1378 −1703 −1330 −1820 −989
Firm-random effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
All tests two-tailed ∗ significant at 10%; ∗∗ significant at 5%; ∗∗∗ significant at 1%
under stronger takeover protection should experi-
ence an increase in long-term shareholder value
(Hypothesis 2a) relative to their counterparts that
do not change their attention to stakeholders.
In contrast, managerial self-dealing suggests that
firms that increase their attention to stakeholders
when shielded from takeover threats should expe-
rience a subsequent decrease in shareholder value
(Hypothesis 2b) relative to those firms that do
not change their attention to stakeholders. Table 3
(Panel A) shows the results of the firm- and year-
fixed effects regressions.
The positive coefficient on the interaction term
between takeover protection and corporate atten-
tion to stakeholders suggests that those firms
which have staggered boards, are incorporated in
Delaware after 1996, and that increase their overall
attention to stakeholders, experience a subsequent
increase in shareholder value one and two years
into the future. In contrast, the negative coeffi-
cient of takeover protection indicates that firms
that do not cater to stakeholders after the increase
in takeover protection experience a subsequent
decline in shareholder wealth one year into the
future. Together, these findings provide evidence
that takeover protection leads to an increase in
corporate attention to stakeholders by relieving
CEOs from short-termism (Hypothesis 2a). In
contrast, the alternative mechanism—managerial
self-dealing (Hypothesis 2b)—finds no empirical
support.
Because takeover protection leads to an increase
in corporate attention toward community and the
natural environment, but not toward employees,
customers, or minorities, I conduct additional anal-
yses to examine how the change in corporate atten-
tion to each stakeholder separately affects future
shareholder value. The results (Table 3, Panel B)
show that long-term stock market value increases
for firms more attentive to community, the natu-
ral environment, and minorities. The increase in
the long-term (two and three years into the future)
stock market value suggests that the value of cor-
porate attention to the above groups may be under-
appreciated by the stock market. In the current
period t , the market does not entirely understand
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Table 3. Panel A. OLS regression results: stock market value, takeover protection, and corporate attention to
stakeholders (all stakeholders)






Takeover protection −0.291∗∗ −0.192 0.017
(0.131) (0.138) (0.150)
Stakeholders −0.031 −0.003 0.081
(0.061) (0.066) (0.072)
Takeover protection∗ stakeholders 0.259∗ 0.276∗ 0.114
(0.139) (0.147) (0.162)
Post 96 0.310∗∗∗ −0.327∗∗∗ 0.570∗∗∗
(0.082) (0.094) (0.088)
Staggered board −0.203 −0.196 −0.426∗
(0.155) (0.176) (0.220)
Delaware incorporation −0.046 −0.493∗∗ −0.980∗∗∗
(0.207) (0.240) (0.306)
Governance Index −0.020 −0.035 −0.035
(0.023) (0.025) (0.029)
Leverage −0.858∗∗∗ −0.139 0.279
(0.226) (0.251) (0.287)
Performance 4.521∗∗∗ 2.194∗∗∗ 0.403
(0.331) (0.408) (0.482)
Size 0.027 0.042 0.176∗∗
(0.056) (0.067) (0.076)
Observations 3773 3154 2698
Number of firms 623 462 413
R-squared 0.14 0.09 0.09
Firm-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Time-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
All tests two-tailed ∗ significant at 10%; ∗∗ significant at 5%; ∗∗∗ significant at 1%
the long-term benefits associated with attention to
those stakeholders, taking up to three years to
incorporate the entire value of such investments
into the stock price.
In contrast, Table 3 (Panel C) shows no signif-
icant effect on long-term stock market value for
companies that increase their attention to employ-
ees or customers. This suggests that the market
does not significantly undervalue corporate atten-
tion to employees and customers because a change
in how firms address the demands of those stake-
holders is incorporated into the stock price either
immediately (for customers), or after one year (for
employees).
DISCUSSION
This study examines how corporate governance
affects firms’ attention to non-shareholding stake-
holders. The results provide support for stake-
holder theory, showing that firms are more likely
to attend to stakeholders when shielded from
takeover threats. In contrast, the hypothesis derived
from the shareholder model, suggesting that cor-
porate attention to stakeholders will decrease with
higher takeover protection, finds no empirical sup-
port. The study provides additional evidence that
relief from short-termism rather than managerial
self-dealing underlines the increase in corporate
attention to stakeholders. Together, these findings
contribute to the long-standing debate about the
purpose of the firm—they document the rele-
vance of the stakeholder model for explaining how
firms’ resources are allocated when the interests
of shareholders and stakeholders conflict. Future
research could try to understand how managers
distribute corporate resources in other types of set-
tings that breach the contracts between sharehold-
ers and stakeholders. Recent examples of corporate
bankruptcies and the subprime mortgage crisis pro-
vide excellent contexts in which to explore the
tension between the shareholder and stakeholder
conceptions of the firm.
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Table 3. Panel C. OLS regression results: stock market value, takeover protection, and corporate attention to
stakeholders (technical stakeholders)












Takeover protection −0.195∗∗ −0.029 0.130 −0.109 0.024 0.109
(0.086) (0.093) (0.103) (0.076) (0.080) (0.089)
Employees −0.096 −0.058 −0.045
(0.058) (0.062) (0.069)
Delaware∗ employees −0.097∗ −0.061 −0.048
(0.058) (0.062) (0.069)
Customers 0.122 0.118 −0.022
(0.079) (0.085) (0.092)
Delaware∗ customers 0.137 −0.003 0.018
(0.159) (0.171) (0.193)
Post 96 0.317∗∗∗ −0.307∗∗∗ 0.587∗∗∗ 0.299∗∗∗ −0.322∗∗∗ 0.580∗∗∗
(0.082) (0.094) (0.088) (0.082) (0.093) (0.088)
Staggered board −0.197 −0.191 −0.429∗ −0.188 −0.180 −0.426∗
(0.155) (0.176) (0.220) (0.155) (0.176) (0.220)
Delaware incorporation −0.071 −0.502∗∗ −0.961∗∗∗ −0.034 −0.491∗∗ −0.973∗∗∗
(0.207) (0.241) (0.307) (0.207) (0.241) (0.306)
Governance Index −0.022 −0.037 −0.037 −0.022 −0.037 −0.036
(0.023) (0.025) (0.029) (0.023) (0.025) (0.029)
Leverage −0.858∗∗∗ −0.151 0.274 −0.880∗∗∗ −0.166 0.282
(0.226) (0.251) (0.287) (0.226) (0.251) (0.287)
Performance 4.497∗∗∗ 2.194∗∗∗ 0.419 4.511∗∗∗ 2.179∗∗∗ 0.419
(0.331) (0.409) (0.482) (0.331) (0.409) (0.483)
Size 0.022 0.037 0.171∗∗ 0.025 0.039 0.173∗∗
(0.056) (0.067) (0.076) (0.056) (0.067) (0.076)
Observations 3773 3154 2698 3773 3154 2698
Number of firms 623 462 413 623 462 413
R-squared 0.14 0.09 0.09 0.14 0.09 0.09
Firm-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
All tests two-tailed ∗ significant at 10%; ∗∗ significant at 5%; ∗∗∗ significant at 1%
The study also contributes to the current under-
standing of the differential corporate attention to
various stakeholders. Takeover protection leads to
higher managerial attention to the natural environ-
ment and community, but has no effect on attention
to customers, employees, or minorities. Moreover,
the stock market undervalues corporate attention to
community, the natural environment, and minori-
ties, but not to customers, or employees. One inter-
pretation of these somewhat surprising findings
may be that community, the natural environment,
and minorities represent institutional stakeholders
that impose normative expectations on firms. In
contrast, employees and customers are technical
stakeholders with whom the firm is involved in
resource exchanges (Mattingly and Berman, 2006).
Benefits that accrue to the firm from attending to
institutional stakeholders are uncertain and difficult
to assess by shareholders. For example, by catering
to community, minorities, and the natural envi-
ronment, firms can acquire intangible and difficult
to measure resources (Atkinson and Galaskiewicz,
1988; Dechant et al., 1994; Galaskiewicz, 1985;
Hart, 1995; Shrivastava, 1995), such as legitimacy
and reputation.
Conversely, benefits that accrue to the firm from
attending to employees and customers are easier
to assess by shareholders because those stakehold-
ers are more central to shareholder value, repre-
senting part of the firm’s traditional production
function (Delery and Doty, 1996; Pfeffer, 1994).
A body of work further shows that customer and
employee-friendly firms are able to attract and
retain a better quality workforce, securing higher
sales and greater shareholder value (Berman et al.,
1999; Luo and Bhattacharya, 2006; Sen and Bhat-
tacharya, 2001; Turban and Greening, 1997; Wad-
dock and Graves, 1997). Together, these findings
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indicate that, when protected from takeover threats,
managers extend their attention to institutional
stakeholders—community and the natural environ-
ment—typically undervalued by the stock market.
Consistent with the results suggesting that the
stock market undervalues corporate attention to
institutional stakeholders, the study finds that firms
that increase their attention to those stakeholders
experience a subsequent increase in their long-
term stock market value. Conversely, since the
market does not undervalue corporate attention to
technical stakeholders, an increased attention to
those stakeholders does not lead to a significant
change in the firm’s long-term stock market value.
Future research could build on these findings in
an effort to extend our understanding of how
governance affects corporate attention to different
stakeholders, and to contribute to the growing
body of work that tries to understand the unique
contribution of each stakeholder group to a firm’s
success (Post et al., 2002).
While the results provide support for relief from
short-termism—suggesting that takeover protec-
tion sets managers free to cater to institutional
stakeholders—the question arises whether take-
over protection also enabled CEOs to derive direct
private benefits. Therefore, in additional anal-
yses, I focus on the impact of the Delaware
takeover protection on executive compensation,
typically considered a factor that significantly
increases managerial welfare (Jensen, Murphy, and
Wruck, 2004). To that end, I use Compustat’s
Execucomp database to collect data on total cur-
rent compensation (TCC), which includes salary,
bonuses, and other annual compensation. The
results (Table 4) show that executive compensation
is higher for takeover-protected Delaware-based
firms compared to firms in the control group.
This finding indicates that, in addition to higher
attention to stakeholders, the takeover protection
in Delaware directly increased managerial welfare
via greater total compensation. One interpretation
of these results suggests that, immune to takeover
threats, managers may have diverted part of cor-
porate resources to directly increase their welfare,
while committing part of the resources to sup-
port the interests of non-shareholding stakeholders.
Hence, one policy implication of these findings
would be to enact state-level takeover protection in
conjunction with policy instruments to discourage
CEOs from pursuing excessive private benefits.
Table 4. OLS regression results: CEO compensation
and takeover protection


























Standard errors in parentheses
All tests two-tailed ∗ significant at 10%; ∗∗ significant at 5%;
∗∗∗ significant at 1%
Future studies could further investigate how exter-
nal governance mechanisms, such as the threat of
hostile takeovers or activist shareholders, should
interact with managerial compensation to impact
the welfare of non-shareholding stakeholders.
A number of additional suggestions for further
research relate directly to the limitations of the
study. A promising avenue of research inquiry
would be to investigate the impact of governance
on the welfare of non-shareholding stakeholders.
The present study is limited with respect to doc-
umenting the impact of takeover protection on
stakeholder welfare. Instead, the study uses KLD
dataset to understand corporate attention to stake-
holders, consistent with the recent developments
in stakeholder research that conceptualize KLD
measures as the indicators of social action toward
stakeholders rather than the indicators of social
performance outcomes (Mattingly and Berman,
2006). Conceptualized in that way, KLD data pro-
vide appropriate measures for the purpose of this
study, which focuses on the inputs of corporate
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attention toward stakeholders rather than the out-
comes of those actions.
Furthermore, KLD data have been broadly criti-
cized for their subjectivity triggered by the percep-
tual standards used by rating agencies in general.
Critics of KLD argue that subjective rating stan-
dards limit the validity and reliability of KLD’s
measures as the indicators of corporate attention
to stakeholders (Entine, 2003). Furthermore, in a
recent study, Chatterji, Levine, and Toffel (2007)
find that KLD environmental measures are poor
predictors of firms’ future environmental perfor-
mance.
Although KLD dataset may be subject to limita-
tions inherent in social rating systems, its advo-
cates argue that the data provide a set of reli-
able and valid measures of corporate attention to
stakeholders (Mattingly and Berman, 2006; Sharf-
man, 1996). Because the purpose of KLD is to
deliver objective information on corporate atten-
tion to stakeholders to institutional investors, the
rating agency has an incentive to remain objec-
tive rather than to be politically or ideologically
driven. Nevertheless, using more objective mea-
sures of social consequences of corporate behavior,
such as corporate expenditures on stakeholders as
a proportion of sales or profits, would enrich our
understanding of mechanisms underlying corpo-
rate attention to stakeholders. Hence, developing
and testing objective indicators of corporate atten-
tion to stakeholders is one of the most important
directions for future research.
Although this study documents that firms pro-
tected from hostile takeovers are more likely to
make charitable contributions to community and
attend to the natural environment, the study is lim-
ited with respect to teasing out the instrumental and
normative components of those actions. Indeed,
one interpretation of the findings may be that firms
engage in a separation fallacy (Freeman, 1994) in
that they separate ‘business’ from ‘ethics,’ buy-
ing off the support of stakeholders via charitable
donations to community and corporate support to
the natural environment. In partial support of this
interpretation, I find that shareholders benefit from
higher attention to non-shareholding stakeholders.
Yet another interpretation of the findings would
suggest that, when immune to takeover threats,
managers are able to integrate socially responsi-
ble and value-enhancing actions and to achieve
‘win-win’ outcomes. This interpretation is consis-
tent with Freeman’s claim contending that, even
though attention to stakeholders has traditionally
been regarded as either the means to achieve man-
agers’ and stockholders’ ends or as the firms’
moral and ethical obligation to all stakeholders,
self-serving and other-serving corporate behaviors
are inseparable (Freeman, 1994).
Whereas this study indicates that instrumen-
tal motives may underline corporate attention to
stakeholders, one could not eliminate the alter-
native explanation suggesting that, when relieved
from takeover threats, managers are more likely to
act as ‘good citizens’ and to enhance the welfare
of shareholders and non-shareholding stakehold-
ers alike. Future studies could contribute to this
discourse by teasing out empirically the motives
behind managerial attention to stakeholders. Fur-
thermore, examining if and how corporate efforts
to address the needs of stakeholders improve the
welfare of those constituencies would shed more
light on this debate.
CONCLUSION
This study is the first one to document the positive
effect of takeover protection on corporate attention
to stakeholders. In the context of hostile takeovers,
two coexisting conceptions of the purpose of the
firm are directly compared. The study finds that
when managers are immune to hostile takeovers,
they broaden their conceptualization of value cre-
ation that privileges the interests of shareholders
and technical stakeholders, such as employees and
customers. Incumbent CEOs expand their attention
to institutional stakeholders, such as the commu-
nity and the natural environment that are indirectly
connected to the public corporation. The study fur-
ther finds that firms that expand their attention
to include institutional stakeholders experience
higher shareholder value in the long run. Overall,
the findings make a step toward advancing a new
understanding of corporate governance—one that
eschews a narrow focus on shareholder interests to
incorporate a broader view of balancing the inter-
ests of all stakeholders in the process of creating
value for organizations and society today.
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Takeover protection 0.131∗∗ 0.312∗∗∗ 0.143 0.302∗∗ 0.001 0.084
(0.052) (0.121) (0.095) (0.123) (0.101) (0.166)
Post 96 0.388∗∗∗ 0.004 0.816∗∗∗ 0.223 0.512∗∗∗ 0.084
(0.073) (0.151) (0.152) (0.171) (0.157) (0.205)
Staggered board 0.035 −0.027 −0.062 0.163 0.061 0.051
(0.071) (0.155) (0.110) (0.179) (0.121) (0.206)
Delaware incorporation −0.160∗∗ −0.465∗∗∗ −0.111 −0.221 −0.080 −0.119
(0.073) (0.153) (0.109) (0.173) (0.117) (0.209)
Governance Index 0.001 0.051∗ −0.025 0.024 −0.011 0.022
(0.012) (0.027) (0.019) (0.030) (0.021) (0.035)
Leverage 0.024 0.258 −0.208 1.398∗∗∗ −0.306 −0.996∗∗
(0.138) (0.295) (0.225) (0.391) (0.249) (0.454)
Performance 0.072 −0.118 0.261 −0.519 0.548 0.761
(0.211) (0.519) (0.331) (0.672) (0.371) (0.722)
Size 0.239∗∗∗ 0.457∗∗∗ 0.326∗∗∗ 0.159∗∗∗ 0.162∗∗∗ 0.164∗∗
(0.025) (0.055) (0.038) (0.057) (0.041) (0.076)
Pension fund ownership 0.022∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.017 0.010 0.040∗∗
(0.005) (0.012) (0.009) (0.017) (0.010) (0.020)
Insider ownership 0.016 −0.030 0.014 −0.049 0.009 0.117
(0.033) (0.078) (0.057) (0.089) (0.064) (0.102)
Observations 4538 4538 4538 4538 4538 4538
Number of firms 878 878 878 878 878 878
Log likelihood −6511 −2391 −3745 −2147 −3308 −1508
Firm-random effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
All tests two-tailed ∗ significant at 10%; ∗∗ significant at 5%; ∗∗∗ significant at 1%
Copyright  2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Strat. Mgmt. J., 30: 261–285 (2009)
DOI: 10.1002/smj
Takeover Protection and Corporate Attention to Stakeholders 285
Table A2. Logistic regression results Corporate atten-
tion to stakeholders two and three years before the
takeover protection
Variables Stakeholders























Standard errors in parentheses
All tests two-tailed ∗ significant at 10%; ∗∗ significant at 5%;
∗∗∗ significant at 1%
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